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Quality of government  
and subjective poverty in Europe 
 





We study the effect of quality of government on subjective poverty across European countries and 
regions, taking advantage of recently released data on the quality of public institutions at the 
regional level, and of information on household subjective poverty. In the analysis we try to 
separate the effects of quantity and quality of public services on perceived well-being, controlling 
for the size of the local government and for the receipt of in-kind services by each household of 
the sample. Results suggest that good governance significantly reduces the probability of being 
subjectively poor, both over the whole population and also among households that are poor in 
terms of monetary income. We then estimate the greater cost that a family has to bear in order to 
achieve a given level of welfare, if it lives in a region with inefficient public institutions. Our 
measure of this inefficiency cost is around 6% of disposable income. 
 
Jel Codes: I32, H1, H7 
Keywords: Quality of government, subjective poverty, minimum income, European regions, 
poverty line.  
 
1 Introduction4 
Empirical research on poverty and inequality is typically based on an income definition that 
includes all forms of cash incomes plus, often, imputed rents on owner-occupied dwellings. 
Economies of scale within the household are taken into account with an equivalence scale. Implicit 
in this traditional approach is the hypothesis that a unit of income has the same effect on well-
being irrespectively of the quantity and quality of public services that are available in the area of 
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residence. To address this deficiency, the value of transfers in kind received from the government 
for free or at prices lower than their costs is sometimes added to cash income (Aaberge et al., 
2013). This is an important correction, since households living in a country where public 
authorities provide good and abundant health and/or education services at low cost can reach 
substantially greater levels of well-being with respect to households that have the same 
composition and cash income but must buy these services, totally or in part, in the market. Studies 
providing estimates of the distribution of “extended” income are, however, based on the implicit 
assumption that the quality of public services and the efficiency of governments are the same 
throughout the country or area where the surveyed households live. However, households 
resident in a region with efficient institutions may reach greater levels of well-being than those 
residing in regions or countries where public services are of inferior quality, for various reasons. 
First, an efficient government can convert a given amount of public expenditure into a greater 
amount of services provided to households. Second, people living in areas with good quality public 
institutions may perceive a higher living standard because they know that they can rely on public 
services when needed. Even households with significant incomes may feel deprived and insecure 
in areas with low quality government -  for example, if they have to buy some goods or services 
from the market because those produced by the state are deemed to be of too poor quality or are 
difficult or impossible to attain, being subject to too much bureaucracy or excessive waiting lists or 
distribution criteria based on cronyism. These differences, which might be substantial, are 
neglected by the traditional approach based on the comparison of equivalent disposable incomes. 
We therefore expect that the quality of government may have an impact on poverty: people with 
low incomes but living in areas with highly efficient governments are likely to feel less poor than 
others with the same monetary income, but inhabiting regions or countries characterized by 
inefficient or corrupt institutions.  
To verify these hypotheses, we take advantage of the recent availability of data providing 
information on the quality of government at subnational level in Europe. In particular, we study 
whether subjective monetary poverty is lower in areas with good quality of government. Our 
study uses microdata on households’ incomes and conditions from the Eu-Silc survey, attaching to 
each household a measure of the quality of government in the area of residence. The analysis 
covers most of the European Union countries and finds that living in regions with high-quality 
services actually reduces subjective poverty. The results are robust to the inclusion in the 
regressions of the quantity of public services present in the area and received by each household, 
allowing us to separate the effects on subjective poverty caused by the quantity of public services 
from those depending on the quality of the institutions. This kind of analysis has direct 
implications for poverty measurement: if quality of government has an impact on living standards 
then, ceteris paribus, the subjective poverty line should be lower in well administered areas, since 
less money is sufficient to reach any given level of well-being. Comparisons in the incidence of 
subjective poverty across countries may therefore provide a different picture after taking into 
account quality of government differentials.  
Section 2 of the paper briefly reviews the literature concerned with the relationship between 
subjective well-being and quality of government; the empirical strategy and the data used for our 
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analysis are described in section 3; section 4 presents the basic results. Section 5 applies a 
correction for government efficiency to the derivation of subjective poverty lines, and section 6 
concludes.  
2 Quality of government, well-being and subjective poverty  
A given expenditure on in-kind services - for example education or health care  - may hide 
profound geographical differences in the way these resources are actually managed and allocated. 
The assumption of equal efficiency of public services may perhaps be justified in relatively 
homogeneous contexts like some North-European countries, but is clearly unfounded for other 
nations where significant differences in the actual quality of public services across regions are well 
documented. In Italy, for example, the divide between the Centre-North and the Southern regions 
is apparent (Afonso and Scaglioni 2006, Agasisti and Sibiano 2011) and may even be widening 
following the cuts in expenditure resulting from the recent crisis and the austerity policies of the 
last few years. The provision of public services may therefore have a different impact on the living 
standards of citizens according to their effective quality. One of the implications of this is that a 
correct measure of equivalent income should encompass also the quality of in-kind transfers 
received, plus that of public institutions in general.  
Quality of government can be seen as an important instrument in the process of converting 
economic resources in factual well-being. In the capabilities approach, for example, the presence 
of institutions that can be relied on may be considered a fundamental condition to achieve an 
ample set of functionings. The ability to circulate in a town to reach places of study or work may 
be severely hampered by lack of safety in the streets or by an inefficient public transport system. 
Similarly, the presence of health care services is not a sufficient condition to guarantee good 
health levels to the population, if these services are difficult to access for a part of the population, 
or too costly, or subject to favoritism or corrupt practices. Many studies have indeed shown the 
presence of a positive correlation between quality of government and good population health 
(Gupta et al. 2000, Hall and Lamont 2009, Rothstein 2011). The large and important institutionalist 
strand of literature focuses on the role of institutions in the development pattern of a country.  
Differences in poverty and inequality among countries are seen as the result of extractive 
Institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001) or of an unequal distribution of the initial 
factor endowments (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002). Easterly and Levine (2002) find that 
institutions are the primary and almost exclusive cause of the economic development of a nation.  
Turning to the relationship between poverty and quality of government, Gupta et al. (2002) find 
that corruption increases inequality and reduces the growth rate of the poorest income quintile. In 
this international comparison, the results are robust using both OLS and IV. Holmberg and 
Rothstein (2010) investigate, instead, the correlation between the level of development of 
democracy and absolute poverty. They show that it is very important to correctly define the 
quality of government, and figure out what can be explained by that definition. They also show 
that a society with a higher level of democracy is not necessarily a society with less poverty. 
Closer to the object of the present analysis, some papers have studied the relationship between 
quality of government and subjective well-being (which can be broadly defined as a measure of 
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how an individual evaluates her quality of life). Chong and Calderòn (2000) for example perform a 
cross-country analysis from 1960 to 1990 and find a strongly negative correlation between 
institutional quality and poverty. They also conclude that quality of government has a positive 
impact on income and equality only for richer countries.  
Ott (2010) uses a dataset including 130 countries and finds that the impact on subjective well-
being of the quality of government is greater than that of measures of democracy and of the size 
of government, and also of the quantity of public goods produced. Helliwell and Huang (2008), 
too, find a strong effect of quality of government on subjective well-being, particularly in the 
poorest countries, where “delivery quality” seems to matter more than the presence of formal 
democratic rules. Also Frey and Stutzer (2000) test if direct democracy and federalism improve 
people’s happiness: they find that federalism improves happiness, but even greater is the effect of 
direct democracy. In this area of research it is often difficult to distinguish between correlation 
and causality, owing not only to problems in the data, but also because the pattern of causality is 
intrinsically difficult to establish with precision. The existence of a clear positive correlation 
between subjective well-being and quality of government, in any case, seems well-founded. Our 
research is the first that, by using microdata on households, focuses on a specific aspect of 
subjective well-being, namely subjective poverty, making use of data about differences in the 
quality of government across European regions.  
   
3 Data and empirical strategy 
The data that we use to measure the quality of public services at the sub-national level come from 
the "Quality of Government Institute" of the University of Gothenburg. In particular, the Quality of 
Government EU Regional Data are the result of a survey carried out at the sub-national level 
across Europe in 2010 and then repeated in 2013 (Charron et al. 2014). The survey was conducted 
over the 28 European Union member countries and involved around 34,000 people in 2010 and 
85,000 in 2013. It  collected information about quality of government not from national experts, as 
is usual for this kind of surveys, but from citizens. Since the aim of this survey was to gather 
opinions about the quality of government at the regional level, at least 400 persons were 
interviewed in 2013 for each of the regions surveyed in the 28 European countries. The questions 
tried to elicit citizens’ opinions about three concepts that constitute important dimensions of the 
general concept of the quality of government: the quality of the services, whether they are 
delivered with impartiality, and the possible presence of corruption in their area of residence. For 
each of these three pillars, the questions considered three areas of policy where variation can 
legitimately be expected in the quality of provision at the local level, being typically administered 
at sub-national level: health care, education and law enforcement. Finally, the survey asked two 
specific questions regarding the ability of the media to identify corruption in the public sector and 
the perceived freedom of elections. Data from this survey were then used to create the "EQI" 
index (European Quality of Government Index) which connects these results with the World Bank's 
well-known World Governance Indicators (WGI), obtaining an index that can summarize the 
quality of government at sub-national level while continuing to consider its multidimensionality. 
The WGI index in this context is computed for each country by taking the country average of four 
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of the World Bank indicators: control of corruption, government effectiveness, rule of law, voice 
and accountability. Then its values are standardized across all EU countries. The resulting number 
is indicated as WGIc in equation (1).    
The EQI index for each region has been calculated as  
(1)                                
i.e. the EQI index for region a in country c is the difference between the regional and national 
results of the answers to the questions, added to the WGI index value for country c as a whole. 
       measures the average of the 16 questions for region a, which is standardized across the 
sample. In the remainder of this paper we denote this index also with QoG, i.e. quality of 
government. In some particular states (especially, but not for all, those in which there is only one 
NUTS1 level) it was not possible to differentiate among sub-national levels: in these cases the EQI 
value is simply the score of the WGI. In some countries there is significant variation in the regional 
QoG indicators - for example in Italy, France, Bulgaria and Spain - while in others the regional 
variation is much lower (Sweden, Denmark, Finland). We study the relationship between this index 
and subjective poverty using as much as possible data at the sub-national level, to increase data 
variability, but for some small countries (CY, EE, LT, LU, LV, MT, SI) the QoG survey provides 
information only at the national level, while for others (DK, DE, IE, NL, PT, RS, SK) the Eu-Silc 
dataset available to researchers does not allow to go beyond the national level. We therefore use 
assign to the households living in these countries only a single value for EQI for each country, 
while for the other countries in the EU-Silc sample (AT, BE, BG, CZ, EL, ES, FI, FR, HU, IT, PL, RO, UK) 
we use information at the sub-national level (see Tab. A3 in the Appendix). 
In addition to quality, we also control for the amount of public services provided at the regional 
level, to reduce the legitimate doubt of omitted variables. The controls we use are four, all 
referring to the same territorial division present in EU-Silc: the number of physicians per 100,000  
inhabitants, the school participation rate of 4 year-old children, the number of public employees 
per capita and the gross value added of the public sector in thousands of Euros per capita. These 
variables come from the European regional Statistics Database provided by Eurostat and (to 
compensate the lack of data regarding the number of physicians for some countries) by the World 
Bank. The Appendix provides more details about these variables. With the introduction of these 
controls, we can differentiate the effect of the quality of services from that of their quantity. In 
addition to these four measures of public service quantity, which are common to all households 
living in the same region, we add two measures of in-kind services specifically received by each 
family, using the information provided in the paper by Aaberge et al. (2013), which estimates the 
distribution of some in-kind services across households for the 28 EU countries.  
 As already discussed, a household living in an area characterized by institutions of good quality 
should find it easier to “make ends meet” with respect to a similar household with the same cash 
income, but living in an area with public services of lower quality. This poor quality may force a 
household to buy, in the private market, goods or services that are substitutes for the public ones, 
in sectors such as health care, transport or education. Therefore, this household actually has a 
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lower standard of living, despite having similar income levels. Further, the presence of corruption 
or too much bureaucracy may produce a sense of insecurity that hampers the perspectives of 
improvement in personal economic conditions.  
To test this hypothesis, we first check if subjective poverty is negatively correlated with the quality 
of government. The basic regression to be estimated is  
                                                                   
The dependent variable, SPia, is 1 if household i lives in area a and declares itself poor, i.e. it is 
subjectively poor, and 0 otherwise. This indicator of subjective poverty is taken from the answer to 
the following question, present in the Eu-Silc survey: “Thinking of your household's total income, is 
your household able to make ends meet, namely, to pay for its usual necessary expenses?”. The 
six possible answers are “with great difficulty”, “with difficulty”, “with some difficulty”, “fairly 
easily”, “easily”, “very easily”. We denote as subjectively poor those households responding “with 
great difficulty” or “with difficulty”. The answer to this question is the same for each member of 
the household, so the unit of analysis is the household, not the individual. The variable EQIa is the  
indicator of quality of government in area a, already described, Yia is the monetary income of the 
household, Xia a vector of its demographic characteristics which are deemed to influence 
subjective poverty, Gia is a vector with the quantity of public goods and services in kind received by 
the household (health and education) and Za is a vector of quantitative indicators of the size of the 
public sector in the region. Notice that in this expression two terms for the quantity of public 
services are present: a measure (Gia) that captures some public goods and services that can be 
attributed to each specific family on the basis of its demographic structure – for example - health 
care or education, and a term (Za) that tries to measure the size of public intervention in each 
area, whose value therefore is the same for all households living in the same region. Examples of 
this second term are the per capita value added produced by the public sector, or the number of 
workers employed in it. The introduction of measures of the quantity of public sector provision is 
necessary since we might otherwise run the risk of exaggerating the effect of quality of 
government on subjective poverty, if quantity and quality are, at least for some areas or for some 
spheres of public activity, positively correlated. All monetary values are expressed at 2013 prices 
with the Eurostat inflation rate for each country and are converted at purchasing power parities 
using the Eurostat price level index.  
We study the impact of quality of government also considering the interrelationship between 
monetary and subjective poverty: if the hypothesis that government efficiency matters for living 
standards is correct, then the probability that a monetarily poor household does not feel itself to 
be poor should be higher in areas with high-quality government. 
The concept of monetary poverty is measured by the standard indicator of relative poverty, 
whereby a person is poor (more precisely, at risk of poverty) if the disposable equivalent income 
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(without the imputed value of public services) of the household is lower than 60% of the median 
disposable equivalent income of the whole nation.5 Therefore, in the expression 
                             |                                               , 
the dependent variable is 1 if the household is relatively poor in terms of monetary income, but 
does not feel poor (i.e., does not think itself able to make basic ends meet “with great difficulty” 
or “with difficulty”). In this case we expect for the estimated coefficient  a positive sign.  
Conversely, for the same reason, among households which are not poor in terms of relative 
income one should find a greater share of subjectively poor respondents in areas with low-quality 
public services. In this case, for the estimated equation 
                        |                                                 , 
the sign of  should be negative.  
In general, the estimated relationship between subjective poverty and the quality of government 
of the region of residence can be distorted for different reasons. First, the causal relationship 
could go in both directions: in a rich area there are few poor persons and also only a few families 
that think themselves poor, but this average high income level can also produce efficient 
institutions, inter alia through high fiscal revenues. To take account of this possibility, in the 
regressions we control for the average income level of the area of residence, computed on the Eu-
Silc data. Second, people can choose to move if they want to live in areas with high QoG; for these 
households, the QoG level is not exogenous, but a choice made by them. We propose a simple 
correction for this case below. Further, there could be a problem of omitted variables, if both 
subjective poverty and QoG partly depend on some variable that we do not consider. For example, 
the level of social capital of the region is likely to be correlated with both subjective poverty and 
QoG. Further, the opinion about personal resources may be influenced not only by characteristics 
of the environment (among which QoG is undoubtedly important) and of the household, but also 
by personal traits like a more or less optimistic attitude towards life in general. Fortunately, the 
Eu-Silc survey for 2013 contains a special section on wellbeing, with a lot of questions also 
regarding these personal appraisals, that can be introduced in the estimation. In the next section 
we present the results obtained with probit regressions and some robustness analyses. 
 
4 Subjective poverty and the quality of government: regression results 
4.1 Results from regressions on pooled data 
We start by using the pooling of the two Eu-Silc surveys for the years 2010 and 2013, which 
correspond to the two years when the surveys concerning the opinion of European citizens on the 
quality of government were conducted. The first regression that we run concerns the effect of the 
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quality of government on the probability of feeling subjectively poor. All regressions are at 
household level. We exclude households with yearly equivalent disposable income lower than 500 
and greater than 300,000 euros, with head aged less than 18 years and with more than 13 
members. Equivalent income is computed using the OECD modified scale. Tab. 1 shows the 
marginal effects on the probability of subjective poverty, estimated after probit regressions. Each 
of these marginal effects is computed as the average of the marginal effects associated with each 
observation of the sample. The coefficient of quality of government is always negative: people 
living in regions where public institutions are on average considered of good quality evaluate 
themselves to be less poor than those with similar income and characteristics but living in areas 
with low-quality government. The increase in the quality measure by one standard deviation 
reduces the probability of subjective poverty by 4%-5%. The first column provides the results of 
the basic specification, which controls only for personal characteristics of the household and of the 
head. As with the other columns, all the demographic and income variables have the expected 
signs. Subjective poverty increases with age but at a decreasing rate. The presence of a chronic 
illness for the head increases its probability, as well as being separated. Education provides a 
shelter against the risk of subjective poverty, and men tend to feel more sure of their incomes 
than women. Equivalent income of the household is negatively correlated with the probability of 
feeling poor, as expected, and also the average income of the area of residence has a negative 
impact on the dependent variable. The year 2013 marks a worsening of the feeling of economic 
wellbeing due to the persistence of the economic crisis. 
The second column adds to the set of explanatory variables those regarding the quantity of public 
services, some of them concerning the macro dimension (equal in value for all households living in 
the same area) and two others that are specific for each household (the value of in-kind health 
and education transfers received). These latter variables have the expected sign, even if only the 
coefficient of health is significant: a family receiving a substantial amount of transfers from health 
or education services feels itself less poor than one with lower in-kind services of this type. The 
effects of these two variables are, however, lower than that of the quality of government. The 
macro variables have a more differentiated impact on the probability of feeling poor. The number 
of public employees per inhabitant in the region of residence does not seem to have any effect, 
while the per capita regional value added of the public sector has an unexpected positive impact 
on feeling poor. Therefore, it seems that the quantity of public sector activity has a negative effect 
on the sensation of being poor only when it takes the form of specific transfers to households, 
while the presence of a big public sector may even increase the diffusion of subjective poverty. 
The quality of government, therefore, seems overall more important for subjective poverty than 
the total dimension of the government.  
One of the main concerns of this type of estimation is the presence of omitted variables that are 
specific to each household and can be correlated with the dependent variable and  the regressor 
of interest. A person may, for example, feel in bad economic conditions even in the presence of 
good income if he/she is pessimistic about life in general. Omitting this attitude can distort the 
coefficient of interest, if the distribution of personality traits is correlated with the different levels 
of perceived local quality of government. The Eu-Silc survey for 2013 contains a special module on 
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wellbeing with a lot of questions capturing personality traits - for example, how much time in the 
past four weeks one has been very nervous , or calm and peaceful, or downhearted or depressed. 
These variables in the 2013 sample turn out to be slightly negatively correlated with our measure 
of regional QoG: ceteris paribus, people living in areas with high QoG are - controlling for the usual 
covariates including household and average regional income - less depressed or nervous than 
similar persons who reside in areas with lower QoG. To control for this interaction, we have 
introduced some of these “emotional” variables in column 3. All of them have the expected sign 
on subjective poverty: those who are nervous, depressed or not happy about their life are 
significantly more likely to be in subjective poverty than persons who are more optimistic. Even 
with these variables, the impact of the quality of government on subjective poverty remains the 
same as before. Another possible form of endogeneity can arise from the omission of a variable 
that may reasonably explain at least part of the relationship between QoG and subjective poverty. 
A variable that is surely correlated with the quality of institutions is the level of social capital in the 
area (Camussi and Mancini, 2016). The relationship between social capital and QoG is complex and 
with great probability causality goes in both directions, but some recent papers (Rothstein 2011) 
suggest that it is the quality of institutions that can produce changes in the level of trust that 
people have towards institutions or people in general: if a person has had recent negative 
experiences in her relationship with public services, or has heard of similar negative events 
occurring to friends or relatives, then she may be less willing to be trustful towards not only public 
institutions, but also in everyday interactions with the others.  We include in the regression of the 
fourth column two measures of social capital computed on the same Eu-Silc dataset for 2013: the 
regional means of the indexes for trust in the police and trust in others. In the sample, both are 
strongly correlated with QoG (correlation coefficient between QoG and trust in the police 0.63, 
between QoG and trust in others 0.37) and, although less, with subjective poverty (correlation 
coefficient between subjective poverty and trust in the police –0.24, between subjective poverty 
and trust in others -0.11). When inserted in the regression, however, the two measures of average 
regional social capital lose their significance in explaining subjective poverty. It seems therefore 
that social capital has not an autonomous impact on subjective poverty, but operates only through 
the effect of QoG. Indeed, this latter variable retains its significant negative effect on the 
dependent variable. Thus the attempt to introduce in the regression all the available variables that 
may possibly produce endogeneity does not therefore change the basic result. Finally, another 
possible form of endogeneity arises if people select where to live also on the basis of 
considerations about the quality of government. The last column of the table removes the 
households of immigrants and of foreigners from the estimation sample, but the effect of quality 
of government does not change, becoming even more significant. The dataset contains 



























      
EQI -0.0513*** -0.0394*** -0.0501*** -0.0417*** -0.0470*** 
 (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0105) (0.0119) (0.0120) 
Age   0.0067*** 0.0064*** 0.0058*** 0.0058*** 0.0057*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
Age squared -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Chronic illness   0.0772*** 0.0773*** 0.0580*** 0.0580*** 0.0561*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Married -0.0537*** -0.0461*** -0.0362*** -0.0362*** -0.0374*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0047) 
Separated 0.0552*** 0.0570*** 0.0518*** 0.0518*** 0.0501*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0053) 
Widow(er) 0.0030 0.0027 0.0025 0.0025 -0.0011 
 (0.0043) (0.0046) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057) 
Foreigner 0.0766*** 0.0742*** 0.0659*** 0.0660***  
 (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0092) (0.0092)  
Male -0.0241*** -0.0246*** -0.0169*** -0.0169*** -0.0190*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0031) 
Secondary ed. -0.0513*** -0.0529*** -0.0473*** -0.0474*** -0.0469*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) 
Degree -0.1187*** -0.1223*** -0.1112*** -0.1112*** -0.1131*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0057) 
# family members 0.0167*** 0.0233*** 0.0249*** 0.0249*** 0.0235*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0021) 
Ln household eq. disp. income -0.2002*** -0.1994*** -0.1918*** -0.1918*** -0.1914*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0056) 
Ln average reg. eq. disp. income -0.0425 -0.0897** -0.0732* -0.0785* -0.0834* 
 (0.0306) (0.0351) (0.0442) (0.0464) (0.0476) 
Nervous    0.0476*** 0.0476*** 0.0478*** 
   (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0041) 
Feels in the dumps   0.0445*** 0.0445*** 0.0412*** 
   (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0051) 
Not calm and peaceful   0.0277*** 0.0277*** 0.0272*** 
   (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0033) 
Depressed   0.0441*** 0.0440*** 0.0429*** 
   (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0046) 
Not happy   0.0681*** 0.0680*** 0.0660*** 
   (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0052) 
Doctors  0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Pre-school  0.0033 0.0554* 0.0606** 0.0446 
  (0.0388) (0.0313) (0.0278) (0.0282) 
Public employees  -0.2753 -0.0746 -0.0736 0.1204 
  (0.3412) (0.3369) (0.3368) (0.3674) 
Public value added  0.0103*** 0.0110*** 0.0119*** 0.0089** 
  (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0044) 
Ln education transfer  -0.0077*** -0.0071*** -0.0071*** -0.0062** 
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  (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0025) 
Ln health transfer  -0.0319*** -0.0328*** -0.0327*** -0.0318*** 
  (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0049) 
Average reg. trust in the police    -0.0173 -0.0189 
    (0.0119) (0.0127) 
Average reg. trust in others    0.0012 0.0077 
    (0.0190) (0.0190) 
Year 2013 0.0161*** 0.0117***    
 (0.0042) (0.0045)    
      
Pseudo R2 0.2474 0.2458 0.2684 0.2685 0.2712 
Observations 435,062 420,894 214,322 214,322 194,449 
Note: the marginal effects are the averages of the marginal effects computed for each observation. Each regression 
contains country dummy variables. All individual characteristics refer to the head of the household. Reference 
variables: single, female, elementary education, year 2010. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level.  
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The second set of estimates is restricted to the sub-sample of households which are relatively 
poor on the basis of cash income, i.e. with equivalent income lower than 60% of the median value 
for their country. We seek to test whether living in an area with good quality of government 
produces a reduction in their probability of feeling poor. In other words, the poor may think 
themselves not so poor if they can rely on the presence of an efficient public administration. From 
Tab. 2, good government quality produces an increase in the probability that a household may not 
feel poor, even if it is actually poor on the basis of disposable income. This result does not depend 
on the possible receipt of a greater quantity of in-kind services, because the regressions control 
for their presence. As expected, psychological traits associated with negative feelings tend to have 
a depressing impact on the dependent variable, but also when controlling for these factors the 
quality of government retains its significance.  
  
Tab. 2 Probability of not feeling poor among the relatively poor households –  marginal effects 


















      
EQI 0.0610*** 0.0453*** 0.0579*** 0.0624*** 0.0626*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0130) (0.0158) (0.0171) (0.0187) 
Age   -0.0139*** -0.0137*** -0.0112*** -0.0112*** -0.0107*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Age squared 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Chronic illness   -0.1079*** -0.1087*** -0.0792*** -0.0792*** -0.0774*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0057) 
 Married 0.0825*** 0.0734*** 0.0477*** 0.0477*** 0.0497*** 
 (0.0073) (0.0081) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0104) 
Separated -0.0555*** -0.0586*** -0.0549*** -0.0549*** -0.0570*** 
 (0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0095) 
Widow(er) 0.0178** 0.0186** 0.0232** 0.0232** 0.0301*** 
 (0.0077) (0.0080) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0099) 
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Foreigner -0.0775*** -0.0746*** -0.0664*** -0.0664***  
 (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0125) (0.0125)  
Male 0.0221*** 0.0224*** 0.0114* 0.0114* 0.0168** 
 (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0074) 
Secondary ed. 0.0754*** 0.0758*** 0.0684*** 0.0684*** 0.0706*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0056) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0074) 
Degree 0.1416*** 0.1445*** 0.1262*** 0.1262*** 0.1416*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0115) (0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0127) 
# family members -0.0189*** -0.0267*** -0.0320*** -0.0321*** -0.0288*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0038) 
Ln household eq. disp. income 0.0256*** 0.0254*** 0.0180** 0.0180** 0.0195* 
 (0.0085) (0.0089) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0102) 
Ln average reg. eq. disp. income 0.1068*** 0.1659*** 0.1514** 0.1509** 0.1860** 
 (0.0414) (0.0472) (0.0760) (0.0748) (0.0791) 
Nervous    -0.0638*** -0.0638*** -0.0648*** 
   (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0090) 
Feels in the dumps   -0.0447*** -0.0447*** -0.0394*** 
   (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0134) 
Not calm and peaceful   -0.0359*** -0.0359*** -0.0353*** 
   (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0081) 
Depressed   -0.0601*** -0.0601*** -0.0597*** 
   (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0107) 
Not happy   -0.0959*** -0.0959*** -0.0924*** 
   (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0086) 
Doctors  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Pre-school  -0.0161 -0.0806** -0.0792** -0.0575 
  (0.0414) (0.0332) (0.0339) (0.0385) 
Public employees  0.1071 0.3988 0.3773 0.2038 
  (0.4850) (0.4852) (0.5010) (0.7109) 
Public value added  -0.0156*** -0.0140*** -0.0137*** -0.0116 
  (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0096) 
Ln education transfer  0.0060* 0.0056 0.0056 0.0055 
  (0.0036) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0074) 
Ln health transfer  0.0361*** 0.0496*** 0.0496*** 0.0496*** 
  (0.0108) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0118) 
Average reg. trust in the police    -0.0063 -0.0073 
    (0.0248) (0.0270) 
Average reg. trust in others    -0.0040 -0.0064 
    (0.0302) (0.0353) 
Year 2013 -0.0236*** -0.0152**    
 (0.0060) (0.0067)    
      
Pseudo R2 0.1877 0.1835 0.2176 0.2177 0.2261 
Observations 67,857 65,212 33,150 33,150 28,568 
Note: the marginal effects are the averages of the marginal effects computed for each observation. Each regression 
contains country dummy variables. All individual characteristics refer to the head of the household. Reference 
variables: single, female, elementary education, year 2010. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level.  





In parallel with the findings so far, living in a region with bad institutions should reduce the 
perception of personal well-being. Thus we expect in this case an increase in the probability of 
subjective poverty among the non-poor. In other words, households which are not poor in terms 
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of income are more likely to feel poor if they have to deal with low-quality local governments. 
From Tab. 3, the probability of being subjectively poor actually decreases with the quality of 




Tab. 3 Probability of feeling poor among the not relatively poor households – marginal effects 

















      
EQI -0.0504*** -0.0393*** -0.0506*** -0.0405*** -0.0464*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0103) (0.0118) (0.0117) 
Age   0.0058*** 0.0055*** 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Age squared -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Chronic illness   0.0671*** 0.0672*** 0.0504*** 0.0505*** 0.0494*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) 
Married -0.0450*** -0.0379*** -0.0312*** -0.0312*** -0.0326*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0048) 
Separated 0.0492*** 0.0506*** 0.0451*** 0.0452*** 0.0432*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0046) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0053) 
Widow(er) 0.0066 0.0063 0.0069 0.0069 0.0042 
 (0.0043) (0.0047) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) 
Foreigner 0.0729*** 0.0711*** 0.0625*** 0.0626***  
 (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0094) (0.0094)  
Male -0.0216*** -0.0222*** -0.0148*** -0.0148*** -0.0162*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0030) 
Secondary ed. -0.0388*** -0.0405*** -0.0359*** -0.0360*** -0.0359*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) 
Degree -0.0914*** -0.0952*** -0.0861*** -0.0862*** -0.0883*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0054) 
# family members 0.0143*** 0.0204*** 0.0214*** 0.0213*** 0.0207*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0019) 
Ln household eq. disp. income -0.2487*** -0.2474*** -0.2446*** -0.2447*** -0.2406*** 
 (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0065) 
Ln average reg. eq. disp. income -0.0127 -0.0579 -0.0361 -0.0452 -0.0485 
 (0.0315) (0.0361) (0.0425) (0.0438) (0.0449) 
Nervous    0.0472*** 0.0472*** 0.0471*** 
   (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0040) 
Feels in the dumps   0.0580*** 0.0580*** 0.0558*** 
   (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0051) 
Not calm and peaceful   0.0278*** 0.0278*** 0.0275*** 
   (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) 
Depressed   0.0361*** 0.0361*** 0.0344*** 
   (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0076) 
Not happy   0.0623*** 0.0623*** 0.0609*** 
   (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0052) 
Doctors  0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Pre-school  -0.0014 0.0494 0.0564* 0.0407 
  (0.0420) (0.0350) (0.0299) (0.0299) 
Public employees  -0.3843 -0.0331 -0.0120 0.1188 
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  (0.3447) (0.3311) (0.3298) (0.3494) 
Public value added  0.0088*** 0.0104*** 0.0116*** 0.0096** 
  (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0042) 
Ln education transfer  -0.0040** -0.0041** -0.0041** -0.0034* 
  (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0020) 
Ln health transfer  -0.0298*** -0.0296*** -0.0295*** -0.0286*** 
  (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0049) 
Average reg. trust in the police    -0.0224* -0.0236* 
    (0.0116) (0.0122) 
Average reg. trust in others    0.0052 0.0117 
    (0.0180) (0.0176) 
Year 2013 0.0139*** 0.0103**    
 (0.0044) (0.0047)    
Pseudo R2 0.2326 0.2307 0.2527 0.2528 0.2543 
Observations 367,205 355,682 181,172 181,172 165,881 
Note: the marginal effects are the averages of the marginal effects computed for each observation. Each regression 
contains country dummy variables. All individual characteristics refer to the head of the household. Reference 
variables: single, female, elementary education, year 2010. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level. 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
4.2 Results from pseudo-panel regression  
A pooling of cross-sections runs the risk of hiding part of the relationship between subjective 
poverty and QoG since it neglects the time dimension and does not allow us to check whether 
changes over time in QoG are correlated with changes in the dependent variable. Since we have 
two years of data, we try to use also this time dimension with a first-difference regression. The 
results should become less precise, not only because of the availability of only two annual 
datasets, but especially because measures of the quality of government change very slowly over 
time, and the two available surveys are only three years apart.  
From the original dataset, we have extracted a pseudo-panel on the basis of the region of 
residence, the year of the survey and four cohorts defined by using the year of birth of the head 
(before 1940, from 1941 to 1955, from 1956 to 1970, after 1970). The result is a dataset of 880 
observations (2 years x 110 regions with QoG measure available in both surveys x 4 cohorts). Tab. 
4 reports the results of OLS first difference regressions. The first couple of columns shows the 
results of a very simple regression of the change in the share of households feeling subjectively 
poor on the change in the measure of QoG. The coefficient is strongly significant, and remains 
significant at 10% level after adding to the regression the changes in the main demographic 
variables. Notice in particular the expected strong significance of the changes in both household 
income and average regional household income. Turning to the results for the two other cases 
discussed above, the coefficient of the change in QoG is significant only for the last relationship 
(next-to-last column), but in all cases the coefficients have the expected sign. We interpret these 
results as a confirmation, with only two points in time, of the basic relationship between QoG and 
subjective poverty also over time, which would require a much more extended time span for a 
more precise measure.  
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% Subjectively poor    % Relatively poor but not 
subjectively poor 
 
% Not relatively poor but subj. 
poor 
EQI -0.037*** -0.016* 0.026 0.016 -0.038*** -0.014 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.023) (0.023) (0.012) (0.010) 
Ln household disp. income  -0.075***  0.024  -0.075 
  (0.028)  (0.017)  (0.059) 
Ln average reg. disp. inc.  -0.229***  0.184***  -0.274*** 
  (0.034)  (0.059)  (0.055) 
Age  0.006  -0.024**  0.003 
  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.007) 
Age squared  -0.000*  0.000***  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Chronic illness  0.033  -0.064  -0.073 
  (0.046)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Married  -0.162**  0.205**  -0.084 
  (0.078)  (0.080)  (0.076) 
Separated  0.184*  0.040  0.189* 
  (0.111)  (0.085)  (0.104) 
Widow(er)  -0.187*  0.410***  -0.049 
  (0.101)  (0.093)  (0.089) 
Foreigner  -0.012  0.186*  -0.271* 
  (0.125)  (0.096)  (0.140) 
Male  0.059  0.058  0.077 
  (0.054)  (0.061)  (0.049) 
Secondary ed.  -0.013  0.086  -0.070 
  (0.056)  (0.059)  (0.054) 
Degree  -0.168**  0.212***  -0.065 
  (0.069)  (0.078)  (0.062) 
# family members  0.029  0.003  0.045** 
  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
Constant 0.030*** 0.037*** -0.036*** -0.046*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.003) (0.010) 
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 440 
R2 0.026 0.384 0.003 0.136 0.023 0.368 




5 The cost of living with a low-quality government  
If households that reside in an area with good governance feel better off than their income would 
suggest, the next question is to try to evaluate the ‘premium’ of efficient government, i.e. what is 
the difference in cash income needed to reach a given level of well-being for people residing in 
areas with different degrees of government efficiency. To this end, we can use another question 
present in the Eu-Silc survey, namely the minimum income question: 
“In your opinion, what is the very lowest net monthly income that your household would 
have to have in order to make ends meet, that is to pay its usual necessary expenses?”. 
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This question has been used several times to estimate the subjective poverty line for various 
household types (Goedhart   et al. 1977, Ravallion 2016). We can extend the usual framework with 
this expression 
                                   
Where Ymin is the answer to the question for household i in region a, EQIa is the EQI index for 
region a, Y is disposable monetary income, X is a vector of characteristics that are deemed to 
influence the opinion on the necessary minimum income, among which the number of family 
members should be the most important variable. The poverty line can be obtained by finding the 
income level that realizes equality between Ymin and Y, thereby 
 (6)   S                            (
            
   
). 
Since we expect for the estimated coefficient   a negative sign, the subjective poverty line should 
be lower, the higher is government quality. The first regression of eq. (5) shown in Tab. 6 controls 
only for the number of family members, while the second also allows for other demographic 
characteristics. The coefficient of government quality is substantially unchanged: considering that 
the mean of the EQI variable in our sample is slightly greater than 0 and its variance is nearly 1 
(since the original EQI is standardized across countries), good governance translates into a nearly 
6% reduction in the income necessary to make ends meet, ceteris paribus.    
Tab. 6 Minimum income and quality of government  




   
EQI -0.0579*** -0.0581*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0022) 
Ln household disp. Income 0.3328*** 0.2897*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0012) 
Ln n. of household members 0.2853*** 0.2443*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0018) 
Age  0.0109*** 
  (0.0003) 
Age squared  -0.0001*** 
  (0.0000) 
Chronic illness  -0.0060*** 
  (0.0014) 
Married  0.0564*** 
  (0.0024) 
Separated  0.0338*** 
  (0.0027) 
Widow(er)  0.0185*** 
  (0.0028) 
Foreigner   0.0177*** 
  (0.0033) 
Male  0.0093*** 
  (0.0015) 
Secondary ed.  0.0712*** 
  (0.0017) 
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Degree  0.1517*** 
  (0.0020) 
Constant 6.0866*** 5.7951*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0135) 
   
Observations 418,491 418,444 
R2 0.5501 0.5659 
Note: estimates include country dummies.  
 
From these estimates, it is possible to compute the subjective poverty lines for the whole sample, 
which are always lower in regions with efficient governments. Table 7 shows the values of these 
lines, for each family dimension. Those for the low (high) QoG areas are obtained using the 
average EQI value for all regions with EQI lower (greater) than its median. The difference between 
the two sets indicate the cost of government inefficiency, i.e. the greater amount of income 
necessary to make ends meet in inefficient areas with respect to a similar household which resides 
in a region with high quality institutions. Taking the results from the last column, for a household 
with 4 members, for example, the minimum income to make ends meet is 1,464 euros higher in 
low-QoG areas, i.e. 122 euros per month. 
  Tab. 7 Estimated annual subjective poverty lines  














1 10178 9007 -1171 8056 7165 -892 
2 13793 12206 -1587 10324 9182 -1143 
3 16476 14580 -1896 11937 10616 -1321 
4 18691 16540 -2151 13231 11767 -1464 
5 20612 18241 -2372 14331 12745 -1586 
6 22327 19759 -2569 15298 13605 -1693 
7 23889 21140 -2749 16165 14377 -1789 
 
Instead of general subjective poverty lines valid for all the countries present in the sample, one 
could compute specific poverty lines for each country, carrying out the regression above only on 
the national sub-samples. An example of this kind of application is provided here for Italy. This 
country is suitable for this kind of application since there are great differences in the quality of 
government at the sub-national level. For other countries with more homogeneous distribution of 
QoG, it would be problematic to obtain - with a single country regression - a significant coefficient 
for the EQI variable. After estimating equation (5), we computed a specific “EQI-corrected” 
subjective poverty line for each of the five macro-areas present in the sample (North-West, North-
East, Centre, South, Islands), using the respective EQI values. When using this correction, the lines 
will be higher, the lower the quality of government in that area. Then we compute also the 
traditional subjective poverty line, without the EQI correction. Comparing the disposable income 
of each household with the corresponding subjective poverty line, we obtain the incidence rates of 
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subjective poverty for the two cases. Fig. 1 compares for the five Italian macro-regions the 
incidence rates for both “objective” relative income poverty (disposable equivalent income lower 
than 60% of the national median) and for subjective poverty, with and without the EQI correction. 
The consideration of the different efficiency levels for government produces an increase in the 
share of individuals that are subjectively poor in the Southern part of the country, and a reduction 
in the North, particularly in the North-East. The difference in the share of subjectively poor 
individuals between North-East and South, for example, rises from 22% to 27% after the 
consideration of QoG among the determinants of subjective poverty. The divide between Centre-
North and South, already substantial on the basis of cash income, is therefore expanded when we 
consider the cost of living in areas with low QoG. 
 




It is well known, at least since Aristotle, that the measurement of income is not sufficient to 
evaluate the well-being of a person, because the standard of living is a multidimensional concept 
that depends on many possible factors, both personal and social. Going from theory to practice, 
however, it becomes difficult actually to consider all the wealth of dimensions that influence well-
being. So, the practice of poverty and inequality estimation often concentrates only on income or 
consumption measurement, and even the attempts to go beyond the simple utilitarian approach, 
considering various spheres of living - e.g. health conditions, or the social conditions in which one 
lives - usually neglect the fact that one of the major determinants of the ability to convert income 
into well-being is the quality of the public institutions of the area of residence. Further, the 
differences in government efficiency within a single country are often so great that using a single 











North-West North-East Centre South Islands
relative poverty subj. poverty without EQI correction
sub. poverty with EQI correction
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have tried to check what is the effect of the quality of government on how households feel about 
the adequacy of their incomes. The results confirm that the effect of living in an environment 
characterized by good governance makes a significant impact on subjective poverty, and that 
quality of government seems to matter more than its quantity. We have also tried to measure this 
effect in terms of the diffusion of subjective poverty, once the poverty lines are corrected for 
government efficiency. Since poor areas within countries often go hand-in-hand with local 
institutions of bad quality, the consideration of governance efficiency produces a widening effect 
in the differences in poverty and living standards between different parts of the country. Official 
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Tab. A1 Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis 
Relative poverty A household is relatively poor if its disposable equivalent income is lower than 
60% of the median of disposable equivalent income of the country of residence 
Subjective poverty Two different definitions of subjective poverty are used in this paper:  
- the first definition (sections 3 and 4) is taken from the following 
question in the Eu-Silc survey: “Thinking of your household's total 
income, is your household able to make ends meet, namely, to pay for 
its usual necessary expenses?”. We denote as subjectively poor those 
households responding “with great difficulty” of “with difficulty”; 
- the second one (section 5) derives from the minimum income question 
in Eu-Silc:  “In your opinion, what is the very lowest net monthly income 
that your household would  have to have in order to make ends meet, 
that is to pay its usual necessary expenses?”. The subjective poverty 
line is obtained by finding the income level that realizes equality 
between minimum income and disposable household income. 
EQI index European Quality of Government Index (equation 1 in the text), constant for 
each household in the same region. Source: Charron et al. (2014) and 
http://qog.pol.gu.se/ 
Age  Age of reference person 
Age squared Age of reference person squared 
Chronic illness The reference person suffers from a chronic illness (dummy) 
Married The reference person is married (dummy) 
Separated The reference person is divorced/ separated (dummy) 
Widow(er) The reference person is widow(er) (dummy) 
Foreigner  The reference person is a foreign citizen (dummy) 
Male The reference person is male (dummy) 
Secondary education The highest education level of the reference person is secondary education 
(dummy) 
Degree The highest education level of the reference person is degree (dummy) 
# family members Number of family members 
Ln household eq. disp. income Logarithm of equivalent disposable household monetary income (OECD 
equivalence scale), at ppp and 2013 prices.   (In Tab. 6 we use the ln of non 
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equivalent disposable income). 
Ln average reg. eq. disp. 
income 
Regional average of logarithm of equivalent disposable household monetary 
income (OECD equivalence scale), at ppp and 2013 prices. 
Nervous  The reference person answers “all of the time” or “most of the time” to the 
question “How much of the time over the past four weeks have you been very 
nervous?” (dummy) 
Feels in the dumps The reference person answers “all of the time” or “most of the time” to the 
question “How much of the time over the past four weeks have you felt so down 
in the dumps that nothing could cheer you up?” (dummy) 
Not calm and peaceful The reference person answers “a little of the time” or “none of the time” to the 
question “How much of the time over the past four weeks have you felt calm 
and peaceful?” (dummy) 
Depressed The reference person answers “all of the time” or “most of the time” to the 
question “How much of the time over the past four weeks have you felt down-
hearted and depressed?” (dummy) 
Not happy The reference person answers “a little of the time” or “none of the time” to the 
question “How much of the time over the past four weeks have you been 
happy?” (dummy) 
Doctors  Number of physicians per 100,000 inhabitants. Source: Eurostat (variable healt 
personnel by Nuts 2 regions, hlth_rs_prsrg), for some countries World Bank 
 (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.MED.PHYS.ZS).  
Pre-school Participation rate of 4-years-olds children in education at regional level. Source: 
Eurostat  (variable name educ_regind). 
Public employees Number of public employees per capita (variable nama_10r_2emhrw Public 
administration, defence, education, human health and social work activities) 
Public value added Gross value added of the public sector in thousands of euros per capita. Source: 
Eurostat  (variable nama_10r_3gva Public administration, defence, education, 
human health and social work activities) 
Ln education transfer Log of total in-kind education transfer received by each household, obtained 
using the coefficients from Aaberge et al. (2013): public spending on education 
per person by age and country, in % of gdp per capita, distinguishing between 
primary, lower secondary, upper secondary education level.   
Ln health transfer  Log of total in-kind health transfer received by each household, obtained using 
the coefficients from Aaberge et al. (2013): health care per person by age and 
country, in % of gdp per capita (7 age classes). 
Average reg. trust in the police Regional average value of the answer to the question about trust in the police 
(from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust)). 
Average reg. trust in others Regional average value of the answer to the question about trust in other (from 
0 (do not trust any other person) to 10 (most people can be trusted)). 
Year 2013 Dummy 1 if the observation is from Eu-Silc 2013 
If not specified, the source of the variable is the Eu-Silc dataset.  
 
Tab. A2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Subjective poverty (first dif.) 435,115 0.305 0.460 0.000 1.000 
Relative poverty 435,115 0.156 0.363 0.000 1.000 
Relatively poor but not subj. poor 435,115 0.069 0.254 0.000 1.000 
Subj. poor but not rel. poor 435,115 0.219 0.413 0.000 1.000 
EQI 435,110 0.118 0.965 -1.981 1.955 
Age  435,067 54.420 16.035 18.000 80.000 
Age squared 435,067 3218.679 1730.976 324.000 6400.000 
Chronic illness 435,115 0.375 0.484 0.000 1.000 
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Married 435,115 0.616 0.486 0.000 1.000 
Separated 435,115 0.099 0.299 0.000 1.000 
Widow(er) 435,115 0.144 0.351 0.000 1.000 
Foreigner 435,115 0.057 0.231 0.000 1.000 
Male 435,115 0.592 0.492 0.000 1.000 
Secondary ed. 435,115 0.435 0.496 0.000 1.000 
Degree 435,115 0.238 0.426 0.000 1.000 
# household members 435,115 2.515 1.353 1.000 12.000 
ln # household members 435,115 0.777 0.548 0.000 2.485 
ln household disp. Income 435,115 9.802 0.989 5.508 13.764 
ln minimum income  418,496 9.727 0.609 7.090 19.245 
ln household disp. Eq. Income 435,115 9.338 0.927 5.397 12.841 
ln average regional household disp. Eq. Income 435,115 9.490 0.738 7.649 10.581 
Doctors 420,942 351.911 95.311 169.300 924.400 
Pre-school 428,987 0.875 0.145 0.308 1.127 
Public employees 428,987 0.103 0.026 0.048 0.166 
Public value added 428,987 4.157 1.717 1.111 12.293 
ln education transfer 435,115 0.018 0.399 0.000 9.347 
ln health transfer 435,115 6.849 3.081 0.000 10.751 
Nervous 220,466 0.131 0.338 0.000 1.000 
Feel in the dumps 220,466 0.078 0.267 0.000 1.000 
Not calm and peaceful 220,466 0.139 0.346 0.000 1.000 
Depressed 220,466 0.079 0.270 0.000 1.000 
Not happy 220,466 0.137 0.344 0.000 1.000 
Average reg. trust in the police 220,466 5.949 0.984 3.523 8.271 
Average reg. trust in others 220,466 5.863 0.858 4.020 8.361 
Year 2013 435,115 0.507 0.500 0.000 1.000 
 





































































































































































































   Note: the values of EQI are the averages over 2010 and 2013, except for the UK where they are the values for 2013.  
